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ARGUMENT
1.
The State Court erred in retaining jaristficiiufi utapltv ilic clcai
Congressional preference for all matters involving Indian children to be
transferred to Tribal Court.
A. The intent of Congress in passing thefesHsmCkiUS Weiferr
Act was to protect Indian culture from being exterminated
through the systematic removal of its children by state
institutions, which includes in its densities the judicial system.
The Indian Child Welfare Act (hereinafter known as "ICWA") was enacted by Congress to
protect the Indian tribes from the systematic decimation of their heritage and culture by the
removal of their children by and through state institutions and the placement of said children in
non-Indian homes. This was done in part as a recognition of Indian tribal sovereignty granted by
treaty with the United States government. Such sovereignty necessarily includes the right and
responsibility of the tribes to make decisions regarding "essentia! tribal relations." Williams v Lee,
358 U.S. 217,219-20, 795 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (I959Xsaying states could act only "where
essential tribal relations were not involved and where the rights of Indians would not be
1

jeopardized"). Child rearing is an "essential tribal relation." See Wakefield v. Little Light, 347
A.2d 228,234,276 Ind. 333,343 (1975)(holding that child rearing is an "essential tribal relation
within the Williams test"). Once the Indian tribes lose their power over their contact with their
next generation of children, tribal sovereignty loses all its efficacy since the tribes themselves will
cease to exist. Mr. Calvin Isaac, the Tribal Chief of the Missippi Band of Choctaw Indians and the
representative of the National Tribal Chairmen's Association, testified during the Congressional
hearings that:
Culturally, the chances of Indian survival are significantly reduced if our children,
the only real means for the transmission of the tribal heritage, are to be raised in
non-Indian homes and denied exposure to the ways of their People. Furthermore,
these practices seriously undercut the tribes' ability to continue as self-governing
communities. Probably in no area is it more important that tribal sovereignty be
respected than in an area as soci a l l y tX%\d culturally determinative as family
relationships. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. KolyffelcL 490 U.S. 30, 34
(1989).
See also Wisconsin Potowatomies v. Houston, 393 F. Supp. 719, 730 (W.D. Mich. 1973)("[i]f
tribal sovereignty is to have any meaning at all at this juncture of history, it must necessarily
include the right, within its own boundaries and membership to provide for the care and
upbringing of its youngs a sine quo-non to the preservation of its identity."}
Congress, therefore, in recognition of the sovereignty of the Indian tribes, passed the
ICWA as a way to allow the tribes to exercise that sovereignty aver their own members. The
ICWA's purpose is.
[t]o protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and
security of Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum Federal Standards
for the removal of Indian children from their families and tlie placement of such
children in foster or adoptive homes or institutions which will reflect the unique
values of Indian culture.
H.R. Rep. No. 95-1386,95th Cong. 2d Sess. 21, reprinted in [1978] U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
2

News. P. 7530 (quoted in Application of Bertelson, 617 P.2d 121,125 (Mont 1980)). These
minimum federal standards must be addressed and satisfied in each and every case involving the
removal of Indian children from their Indian parent.
The ICWA grants the Indian tribes exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising on Indian
territory (1911(a)) and grants both the state »nd the tribe? concurrent jurisdiction on c a ^ wHere
the child is not domiciled on Indian territory, with the provision that a state esse will be transferred
to the tribal courts upon a motion by either parent, absent parental objection, good cause to the
contrary or declination by the tribal court. Thus, while a state court is not divested of its
jurisdiction over such cases, the strong presumption is that such cases will be handled by the
tribal courts in order to better protect the interests of all parties involved, including that of the
tribes themselves.
Even though a state court may have concurrent jurisdiction under ICWA does not
necessarily mean that they should not transfer the case to the tribal court. "That a state court may
assume jurisdiction in a case of this nature is not to say that it should " Rertelson^ 6TJ\ P 2d at 12*
Congress has already expressed its preference that such cases should be heard by the triK^l courts,
in light of their special situation in regards to the federal government and the state courts' track
record of previous removals of Indian children from their homes. "Assumption of jurisdiction
ignores the inherent bias of a non-Indian society against Indian culture and fails to protect the
Indians right of self governmentn IcL at 128 (quoting Note, 21 Ariz I. Re 1121,1131 (1979))
"Although the presence and domicile are handy jurisdictional rules, these tests largely
ignore the ethnic identity of the child and cultural ties to the tribe. Indian tribes retain an inherent
'quasi-sovereignty' which provides a safeguard against state interference in the internal tribal
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affairs. Thus, where the interests of an Indian tribe arc involved m a custody dispute, a state court
must consider the unique status which Indian tribes occupy under the law.* Bertelson, 671 R2d at
128.
The cases cited above, as well as the Congressional hearings accompanying the passage of
the ICWA clearly show the preference for Indian jurisdiction over Indian children where at all
IfXSijdILflKs.
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court to override this preference. Appellee argues that such circumstances exist in this case, but
all she has referred to in her argument are the geographical concerns typical to a forum non
conveniens argument. Such concerns, while valid, are not enough to overcome the presumption
that Indian courts are still better equipped to deal with situations involving the termination of the
parental rights over an Indian child. "To assume jurisdiction based solely on location of a child or
parents or of various activities is to ignore the importance of ethnic heritage and customs.
Presumably the tribal court is better equipped to consider the ethnic identity as a factor in
determining the child's welfare than is a state court." Bertelson, 671 P.2d at 129.
In the case at hand, the state court ruled to maintain jurisdiction, despite both Appellant's
and the Eastern Shoshone Tribe's arguments for transfer. Appellee argues that the Tribe's interest
was fully protected by the court's allowance of the Tribe to intervene in the proceedings and to put
on witnesses to testify as to tribal culture and the detrimental effect the termination of Appellant's
parental rights would have on all of the Indian parties involved. Such protections are not adequate
in that the state court was not in a position to fully comprehend the intricacies of Indian life and
culture. The Tribe's witness, Mr. Haman Wise, testified as to how Indian culture and beliefs are
passed down from generation to generation orally and as to the importance of maintaining contact
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with the tribal elders and the extended family so as to becomefolly^zzz^Xii lj ;!-_ Lll-v Ik c*JLl
inai aitnough ihe tube would not turn away any any Indian child who returned later in life to regam
their roots, it would be difficult for such a child to do so since the tribe has not had the benefit of
the contact with the child over the years. He said:
I am an elder. I take a child that was raised off the reservation. I have my contact
with him alii these years. I have to have contact I have to see how he was raised.
I have to see the things that he does for him to fit into the responsibilityft>rme to
pass on to him. So therefore, you take a child away and the elder don't see him
and all of a sudden he comes up, he can not hand the traditional ways of life down
to him. He has to be in contact with him at all times. He's got to know where he's
at, what he's doing, what trouble he's been in or how good he was and all this.
That's the way our traditional values is handed down in our Indian children."
See Transcript of hearing dated November 30 and December 1,1994 p. 190. He also testified
that the traditions and values of the Indian culture were not taught to non-Indians so that it would
not be possible for a non-Indian to pass on such things to the Indian children. Id at 187. The
restraint against teaching non-Indians about Indian ways would also extend to state court judges.
This problem would not exist in tribal court where there would be no need for testimony
concerning Indian culture and the potential damage to it since the tribal court itself would already
be aware of it
Judgingfromthe questions asked of Mr. Wise by the guardian ad litem in which he
attempted to analogize the teaching of Indian culture to Indian children to the provision of services
to teach a non-Indian such things, it is obvious that he did not fully understand the witness'
testimony concerning their ways and values, even despite his anthropology degree. It leads one to
conclude that if he did not understand, the court would be unlikely to as well, due to the reliance
which the court has on the lawyers to present the pertinent facts and arguments. It is therefore also
obvious why Congress felt it incumbent on them to place the preference for jurisdiction in such
5

cases with the tribal courts. As it was so aptly put by Mr. Wise, "[Y]ou have to look at it in a way
that I look at it, which would be very hard for you to look at it the way I'm looking at it because
you have no sense of my way of life? See Transcript p. 193. Indeed, the state court has no sense
of the Indian way of life, which is why Congress wanted such matters handled in tribal court.
B . N e i t h e r JMIW?I* * k m | l * l K P ^IICVW4MI t& K f l t w «M* atwstOklytt** *'«***>

over the issue of jttrisctteti&a, espeekt&y considering the interests
of the Tribe that still exist in the children and the tendency of
the state courts to undervalue the importance of tribal culture.
Appellee argues that even without the forum non conveniens argument, the ICWA itself
gives one parent an absolute veto over the transfer of the proceedings to the Tribal Court. To
allow such an argument any weight is to ignore the basis behind the ICWA by granting the nonIndian parent the ability to deny the tribe's interest in their own lineage. The ICWA was not meant
to be superseded by the actions of any individual parent. Congress enacted the ICWA because of
concerns beyond the wishes of individual parents, finding that the "removal of Indian children
from their cultural setting seriously impacts a long term tribal survival and has a damaging social
and psychological impact on many individual Indian children." Holyfield. 490 U.S. at 50.
The ICWA does allow for one parent to object to the transfer of the case to the tribal
courts, but this veto is not an absolute veto, for to allow an absolute veto would be to nullify the
intent of the ICWA to protect the interests of the Indian child, the Indian parent and the Indian
tribe. Congress instead gave the non-Indian parent a qualified veto so that in appropriate cases, the
state could maintain jurisdiction. The strong presumption is that the interest of the Indian child,
the Indian parent, and the Indian tribe can best be evaluated in a tribal court where there is more
familiarity with the unique Indian culture and values that have been shown to have been largely
ignored in the state courts. "[I]t is essential to the purposes of ICWA to allow appropriate tribal
6

authorities to determine these matters according to tribal law, customs and mores best known to
them. Since, as noted above, the state social service agencies, and state courts are part of the
problem, transfer of jurisdiction over Indian child custody matters to tribal authorities is mandated
by ICWA whenever possible." Matter of Welfare of B.W., 454 N.W.2d 437,446 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1990).
The qualified veto of a parent is governed by the application of a modified forum mm
conveniens argument in which the traditional factors of hardship and availability of witnesses are
balanced against the tribal interests protected by the ICWA. "The legislative history of ICWA
specifies that state courts are to apply a 'modified doctrine of forum non conveniens, in
appropriate cases, to insure that the rights of the child as an Indian, the Indian parent or custodian,
are fully protected.'" H.R. Rep. No. 1386, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 21, reprinted m [1978} U.S. Code
Cong. And Admin. News pp. 7530, 7544 (quoted in Bertelson. 672 P.2d at 126).
Appellee argues that the forum non conveniens test was satisfied in that the children had
been living with her in the area, that all of the witnesses who were to testify were present in the
area and that it would be an undue hardship for them to travel to the tribal court in Wyoming.
First of all, the children had not been living with her at all, but rather had been living in Jensen
with their maternal grandmother. Also, she ignores the fact that the witnesses who would be
necessary to testify before the court concerning the tribal interests in the children and the Indian
ways and customs of which the state court is unaware would be faced with the same hardships of
travel as her witnesses, which offsets her geographical argument. In fact, the attorney for the
Tribe, the tribal elder and appellant did travel all that distance. However, appellant's aged mother
was unable to attend and to testify due to the distance from Fort Wasaki to Vernal. Finally, with
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the modified forum non conveniens test, each and every factor does not carry equal weight so that
the jurisdictional question would be settled by a mere mathematical formula.
The decision not to transfer to tribal court on the basis of forum non conveniens cannot be
made solely on geographical considerations. In the Interest of Armell 350 N.W.2d 1060 (111. Ct.
App. 1st Dist. 1990) says that "liberal expansion of the fnnxm non conveniens doctrine would
preclude transferring jurisdiction to tribal courts except in eases on or near a reservation...
[which] would be contrary to the Congressional findings and goals incorporated into the ICWA*
Id. at 1067. While geographical considerations are a factor to be considered, they cannot be the
entire basis for the decision not to transfer in that such a decision would lead to forum shopping
and would give the non-Indian parent the ability to circumvent the ICWA by removing the Indian
child from the area, thus effectively cutting off contact with the child's tribe. While the
geographical considerations are a factor in deciding jurisdiction,ttc[o]ur goal should be to resort to
the most appropriate forum rather than to the most easily accessible forum/" Bertelson, 671 P.2d
at ? (quoting Note, 21 Ariz L. Rev, 1123,1133 (1979)), In this case, the most appropriate forum
would have been the tribal court.
C. The standards for termination of parental rights under the
Indian Child Welfare Act exists in any proceeding involving
Indian children, which these children are without dispute*
It is not disputed in this case that the children are enrolled members of the Eastern
Shoshone tribe. As such, the ICWA applies to these children as a protection of both their rights to
their Indian heritage and the tribe's right of self-preservation through it? children The intention of
Congress for the ICWA to apply to any action involving the familial ties among Indians has been
definitively expressed. "Any Indian child who is the subject of any action for foster care
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placement or termination of parental rights under State law, any parcrti or Indian custodian from
whose custody such child was removed and the Indian child's tribe may petition any court of
competent jurisdiction to invalidate such action upon a showing that such action violated any
provision of sections 1911,1912, and 1913 of this title [meaning ICWA 25 U.S.C. §1914]." In
the Matter of M E M . , 679 R2d 1241,1243 (Mont. 19S4). See aim In the Matter of C.E.H., &37
S.W.2d 947 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1992Xthe Act "seeks to protect the rights of the Indian child as
an Indian and the rights of the Indian community and tribe in retaining its children in its society*
(quoting Matter of Adoption of Crewes. 825 P.2d 305,309 (1992)); Matter of Coconino County
Juvenile No. J-10175,736 P.2d 829, 832 (Ariz Ct. App. 1987X"[t]he fact that a child may have
been living in a non-Indian home is no wesson, sts&k&og slone, to dispense with the provisions of
the Act. When the act is read as a whole, it is clear that Congress has made a very strong policy
choice that Indian children, including those who have a non-Indian parent, belong in an Indian
home.") Appellee's argument to the contrary smply ignores the legislation and the appropriate
caselaw.
Therefore, in each and every case which would affect the rights of Indians in their familial
relationships, the ICWA will apply. The question becomes only whether the Indian child is
domiciled or residing on the reservation, which would fail under section 1911(a), or whether the
domicile or residence is off the reservation, which would fall under section 1911(b). For the state
court to rule that the ICWA does not apply to a proceeding for the termination of an Indian
parent's rights in Indian children is contrary to both the language and purpose of the ICWA and is
therefore clearly in error.
D. The "Indian Family Exception" is a judicially-created
exception established in cases involving illegitimate children
9

where the mother is a non-Indian and should not he extended
beyond that factual situation.

Appellee argues that the ICWA has no bearing on this case in that the children are not
being removed from an Indian family since she claims that Appellant never taught his children the
Indian ways and customs. Her argument is irrelevant in that there is no "Indian Family Exception"
in the ICWA. The exception to which she refers is a judicially-created exception fabricated by the
courts to deal with the unique and difficult situation involved when a non-Indian mother
voluntarily relinquishes her parental rights to an illegitimate Indian child.

S.A. v. E.J.P., 571

So.2d 1187, 1189 (Ala. Ct. App. 1990) says that "[t]he 'Existing Indian Family' exception has
been applied to those fact situations involving the voluntary relinquishment of an illegitimate Indian
child by its non-Indian mother." In such cases, the courts who have created and utilized this
exception found that the child had never been exposed to Indian culture and were for all intents
and purposes considered to be non-Indians. This is not the fact scenario present in this case,
therefore those such cases are distinguishable from the case now before the Court. Appellant and
Appellee lived together as man and wife and were married for a long period of time Fach of the
children are enrolled members of the tribe. Nor should the exception be stretched to apply to this
situation since to do so would run counter to the intent of Congress in enacting the ICWA. The
intent of Congress was to redress the wrongs done to the Indian tribes by governmental agencies,
which includes the court system
The Court in the Matter of Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973 (Alaska 1989) said that" in
enacting ICWA, Congress did not seek simply to protect the interest of individual Indian parents.
Rather, Congress sought to also protect the interest of Indian tribes and communities and the
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interests of the Indian children themselves. Reliance on a requirement that the Indian child be part
of an Indian family for the Act to apply would undercut the interests of Indian tribes and Indian
children themselves that Congress sought to protect,. " Id at 977. It goes on to caution state
courts, saying that "judicially created exceptions to the coverage of ICWA are somewhat suspect in
light of the Act's purpose of imposing federal procedural safeguards State courts must he
particularly hesitant in creating judicial exceptions to a federal act which was enacted to counter
state courts' prejudicial treatment of Indian children and communities" IdL at 977. See also In re
Juniors M.. 144 Cal App. 2d. 786, 193 Cai. Rptr. 40,46 (1983)("We note that the trial court
predicated its decision not to apply the Act in part, on its determination that the minor had
developed no identification as an Indian The language of the Act contains no such exception to its
applicability and we do not deem it appropriate to create one judicially. *); In re Custody of S.B.R.,
719 P.2d 154, 156 (1986)("The Browns assert that the Act does not apply where the child has
never been part of an Indian family relationship. Again, the language of the Act contains no such
exception and the Browns have presented no compelling reasons to create one.") The Court in
T.N.F. went on to assert that "to utilize a judicially created 'Indian family' exception would be to
enter onto a slippery slope which threatens to exclude the very type of cases Congress had in mind
when it adopted the Act." T.N.F. at 978.
The courts in Idaho have gone even further in their cautions against recognizing this
judicially created exception, holding that the matter has been addressed by the highest court in the
land and found wanting. In the Matter of Baby Boy Doe. 849 P.2d 925, 931 (Idaho 1993), says
"[ajlthough an Indian family requirement has been applied by courts of ether states, we believe
that the United States Supreme Court has effectively undermined the imposition of this
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requirement." (Court cited Holyfield for this.) The "application of an Indian family requirement
would allow the non-Indian mother to circumvent application of ICWA and the tribe's interest in
the child by making sure that the child is kept away from the reservation and out of contact with
the father and his family. This would undermine the tribe's interest in its Indian children, which the
Supreme Court recognized in Mississippi Choctaw (Holyfield)." Id. at 931-32. The Court went
on to "also reject application of an Indian family requirement because the provisions of ICWA donot contain any limitation based on where the child is located. Limiting ICWA to situations in
which an Indian child is being removed from an existing Indian family is, therefore, a judicially
created exception to ICWA. Congress passed ICWA to limit state court power by creating
mandatory protective procedures and minimum evidentiary standards that must be applied in child
custody proceedings concerning Indian Children, In light of the structure and nature of ICWA, it
is inappropriate to use a judicially created exception to circumvent the mandates of ICWA." Id at
932. Appellee in this case has been particularly vocal in trying to keep the chldren from their
Indian heritage, although she has never turned down the tribal entitlement checks for the children.
The youngest child was not even aware of her Indian heritage. Transcript pp 255-26, 259-60.
There is a conflict among the courts that have dealt with this issue as to whether or not the
ICWA applies to disputes concerning custody among family members. In re Custody of A.K.K,
502 N. W. 2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) discussed this conflict. The Court in A.K.H. had to deal
with an intra-family dispute over custody of an Indian child between the parents and the
grandparents. The Court noted that Bertelson says that the Act doesn't apply to such disputes in
family, while A.B.M v. M.K, 651 R2d 1170 (Alaska 1982) cert denied 461 U.S. 914,103 S.Ct
1893, 77 L.Ed.2d 283 (1983) says that it does. They resolved the conflict by determining that

12

"[t]he Act makes no reference to exceptions for custody disputes within extended family.* A.K.A.
at 794. They noted that custody disputes from divorce and juvenile delinquency actions arc
specifically exemptedfromAct by 25 U.S.C §1903(1), so if all intra-family disputes were meant
to be excluded, it would have been done specifically exempted as such. "To hold that intra-family
disputes are not subject to the Act would in effect create a third exception which would be
contrary to law." A.K.A. at 795. Cf. Steeves v. Campbell 598 N.W. 2d 817 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993). While Steeves disagrees with A.K.H. about the preemption aspect of the ICWA over intrafamily custody disputes, it is proper to transfer such cases because it would 1) discourage parental
kidnaping for forum shopping purposes; 2) no conflicting decrees from tribal and state courts; 3) it
recognizes the cultural identity of the child and promotes tribal integrity; 4) federal policy
encouraging tribal autonomy; 5) it satisfies parens patrial role of both state and tribe in protecting
the welfare of the child.
It would be against all common sense to hold that a family that consists offivepeople, four
of whom are enrolled tribal members is not an Indian family. The caselaw and the statutes are
against creating an imaginary exception such as Appellee advocates.
State courts do have the jurisdiction to award custody of Indian children pursuant to a
divorce decree entered in their courts, but it is important that all pertinent issues concerning a
award of custody under a divorce decree be raised at the time the divorce is granted. Appellee in
this case failed to raise any such concerns as were put forth in the termination proceedings at the
time of the parties' divorce. Further, it was inappropriate for such an action to be brought later
since the children in question have not be raised at home with Appellee and her husband, Mr.
Robertson, as claimed by Appellee, but instead have been raised in the home of their maternal
13

grandmother in Jensen, Utah.
2.
Whether or not the expert witness called to testify at trial as to the
detrimental effect to the children should they be returned to the care of their
father was qualified as a witness under the Indian Child Welfare Act was
never decided by the trial court because the witness was never put forward as
an expert witness.
Under the ICWA, there must be testimony by a qualified expert as to whether it would be
seriously detrimental for the children to be returned to the parent whoserightsare to be
terminated. Guidelines for determining the qualifications of an expert were given in by Bureau of
Indian Affairs and are as follows:
b) Persons with the following characteristics are most likely to meet the
requirements for a qualified expert witness for purposes of the Indian child custody
proceedings:
I) a member of the Indian child's tribe who is recognized by tribal community as
knowledgeable in tribal customs as they pertain to family organization and child
rearing practices;
ii) a lay expert witness having substantial experience in the delivery of child and
family services to Indians and extensive knowledge of prevailing social and cultural
standards and child rearing practices within the Indian child's tribe;
iii) a professional person having substantial education and experience in the area of
his or her specialty
In the Matter of MJE.M., 635 P.2d 1313, 1318 (Mont misquoting

44 Fed Reg. 67593

(1979)). These guidelines were intended to help bring before the trial court the best evidence as to
whether termination of parental rights should proceed and were meant to add to the court's
understanding of the impact such a step would have on the welfare of all interested parties,
including the Indian tribe. "We are aware that these guidelines add a dimension to expert
testimony not normally required. 1 lowever we feet these guidelines comport with the spirit of the
ICWA and therefore deem them to be applicable." M.E.M. at 1317. It is important to have expert
testimony before the court so that all aspects of the case can be considered, especially considering
14

the finality of a termination of parental rights.
In this case, Mr. Augustus, the witness put forward to testify as an expert at the termination
proceedings, may or may not have been qualified under the BIA guidelines to form an opinion as
to termination of an Indian parent's rights in his or her children, but both the procedure that he
used to formulate his opinion and the manner in which his testimony was introduced at trial
prevent his testimony from qualifying as the requisite expert testimony the ICWA call for in its
termination provisions. Mr. Augustus only met with the children the night before he was to testify
in court concerning their emotional state and the meeting only lasted for approximately one hour.
While Mr, Augustus may or may not have experience in evaluating children, he lacks experience
dealing with Native American issues, which would make the limited contact he had with the
children less likely to produce a valid and complete understanding of the complex situation that is
common with Indian children. He also did not seem to take into consideration that the children
had been without much contact with their father for quite some time and had only their mother's
opinion of their father upon which to base their understanding of his character Judging from her
testimony concerning him throughout the proceedings, such opinion could not have been
complimentary in nature nor likely to induce the children to harbor favorable feelings towards their
father. No reference was made to his special qualifications as is necessary under ICWA. Also, the
expert never spoke to Appellant pnor to his testifying in court. His testimony was simply not
sufficient for termination under the ICWA.
Also, neither the Appellee nor the guardian ad litem requested that he be allowed to testify
as an expert witness, possibly because they suspected that this witness could not be qualified under
ICWA if they did so. Therefore, Appellant was never given an opportunity to voir dire the witness
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to fully explore his qualifications upon which his allegedly expert opinion was based. Since
Appellee never moved to admit Mr. Augustus' testimony as that of an expert witness, it cannot be
so used now. The motion of the Tribe and Appellant to dismiss Appellee's case for failure to
adhere to the statute should have been granted. Appellee, even with the last ditch efforts of the
guardian ad litem, failed to support her case under the ICWA requirements.
3.
The right of a parent whose rights are to be terminated in his or her
children to receive remedial services is an integral provision of the Indian
Child Welfare Act and there are no exceptions set forth in the language of the
statute itself to excuse anyone from that requirement.
"Once a parent has intervened, he or she is entitled to several additional rights: 1) to
appointment of counsel if indigent (1912(b)); 2) to examine all reports or other documents filed
with the court upon which any decision with respect to termination of parental rights may be based
(1912(c)); 3) to have the court satisfied c that active efforts have been made to provide remedial
services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of Indian family and that
these efforts have proved unsuccessful' (1912(d))." In the Interest of S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603,
606 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). Theserightsare set forth in the Act itself and nowhere did Congress
express any reservations or make any exceptions as to when theserightswere to be denied. To
terminate a person's rights in their offspring is a serious proceeding and it requires that every effort
must be made prior to allowing the destruction of a right so fundamental to the human spirit. It
seems that in this case, there were resources available through the State for the appointment of a
guardian ad litem and for the supervision of visitation by the Division of Family Services. The
argument that a private person such as Appellee could not be required to provide those services
loses a little of its efficacy in light of the efforts that were put forward. If Appellee had sought the
aid of the State prior to instituting the termination proceedings, then this requirement could have
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been fulfilled and the ICWA satisfied, at least on that point.
There was no need for immediate termination in this case. The children were never in any
danger, nor was there any reason for Mr. Robertson to adopt these children. Appellant has never
threatened his children, nor were his children going to be returned to his custody. Appellant
instead has had only the best interests and continuing welfare of his children in mind. Further, the
children never had been living with Mr. Robertson in his home as a family. Rather, the twin boys
were living with their maternal grandmother in Jensen, Utah, so it stretches the imagination to see
how any sort of familial bond could have developed between the boys and Mr. Robertson. There
was also no need for Mr. Robertson to adopt the children since it would accomplish no purpose
and only serve to cut the children off from their ties to their tribe, which has already been pointed
out to be a great detriment to their future well-being.
4.
The standard of proof in termination cases under the Indian Child
Welfare Act is one of clear and convincing evidence for the issue of whether
good cause exists not to transfer the case to the Tribal Court, but the standard
of proof is one of beyond a reasonable doubt as to whether the best kitei e»te
of the children require the termination of parental i igiu».

The burden of showing "good cause to the contrary" must be carried by the State with
clear and convincing evidence that the best interests of the child would be injured by such a
transfer. M.E.M., 635 P.2d at 1317. See also Matter of T.S., 801 P.2d 77,79 (Mont. 1990).
Also, it is presumed that it is in the best interests of the child to protect his or her relationship to the
tribe. Holvfield. 490 U.S. at 50, n. 24 (quoting In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No.
S-903. 130 Ariz. 202,204,635 R2d 187, 189 (Ariz. Ct App. 1981)).
While "clear and convincing evidence" is the standard of proof for determining whether the
state court should maintain jurisdiction, the ICWA requires "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" that
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the best interests of the children require termination of parental rights. C.W., 479 N.W.2d 195,
115. Section 1912(f), in which the burden of proof language is found, deals with involuntary
proceedings to terminate the parental rights of an Indian parent There is no exception in the
language of the section that limits the requirement of expert testimony or lowers the buiden of
proof necessary for termination of parental nghts to cases cases where the child is being removed
from his home only. The language of the section clearly states that "no termination of parental
rights be ordered in such proceedings Fmeaning the invnluntarv termination of narerrtal rights] in
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testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or
Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child."
(Emphasis added.)
The standard of beyond a reasonable doubt also applies to the provision that rehabilitative
services have been offered to the parent whose rights are to be terminated and that they have
proven unsuccessful Matter of Welfare of M.S.S., 465 N.W. 2d 412 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
The trial court must be satisfied that the parent has been extended every opportunity to correct his
or her deficiencies as a parent and that the parent in question has failed to correct those
deficiencies.
There is conflicting testimony as to whether Appellant provided for the support and
maintainance of his children. Appellant testified that he worked to support his family in the oil
field, that he bought the trailer in which they lived, that he bought groceries and clothes for the
family, that he provided medical insurance of the children, and that he looked after and cared for
his children physically and financially. See Transcript pp. 272-276. He also testified that he was
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attempting to pass on Indian culture to his children the best that he could. Transcript pp. 276-278.
5.
The trial court did in fact overrule the previous law of the case in
holding that the Indian Child Welfare Act did not apply to the termination
proceedings.
Appellee asserts that Judge Wilson's ruling holding that the ICWA did not apply to the
proceedings was not overruling the law of the case because he was deciding termination standards
and not jurisdictional questions isridiculousin the extreme. The ICWA application to proceedings
involving termination of parental rights over Indian children is not limited to jorisdictronal issues,
but sets forth an entire scheme as to the standards that must be applied by state courts when
jurisdiction is retained. To hold that the Act applies only to the determination ofjurisdiction but
not to the actual termination proceedings itself is to negate the purpose and indeed the very
language of the ICWA.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons and based on the arguments set forth above and in Appellant's initial
brief, the Court Order terminating Mr. Coando's parental rights should be overturned and any
farther action concerning these issues should be remanded to the Tribal Court for the Eastern
Shoshone Tribe of the Wind River Reservation.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s ^ ^ d a y of August, 1996.
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CINDY gARTON-COOMBS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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